> For the complete documentation index, see [llms.txt](https://davin-hong3.gitbook.io/d/llms.txt). Markdown versions of documentation pages are available by appending `.md` to page URLs; this page is available as [Markdown](https://davin-hong3.gitbook.io/d/incident-response-playbook/incident-response-process.md).

# Incident Response Process

Based on Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Agency (CISA)

Used for incidents with confirmed malicious activities for which the incident has been declared or not ruled out.

## Incident Response Process

<figure><img src="https://2068334946-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fow1iM27u7disHeJiSlBC%2Fuploads%2FPTcBWWHVdyZP0kL2hF6i%2Fimage.png?alt=media&amp;token=caa04293-95d6-42be-91a5-cb240f8e65c4" alt=""><figcaption><p>Incident Response Process</p></figcaption></figure>

## 1. Preparation

#### 1.1 Document & training on policies and procedures for Incident Response

* Define a baseline for "normal" --> Identify deviations
* Staffing plans --> Coordination Lead
* Notification procedures&#x20;
  * Infrastructure for classified & out-of-band communications (Escalation & Reporting)
  * Reporting to law enforcement
* Contingency plans
  * Surge support & additional resourcing
  * Assign roles & responsibilities
* Testing Procedures & Staff Readiness
* DRP (Disaster recovery), BCP (Business Continuity), backup policies

#### 1.2 Infrastructure

* Infrastructure diagram & Asset Inventory (Updated) --> Systems, networks, cloud platform, 3rd party hosted networks
* Sensor monitoring & detection: AV, EDR, DLP, IDS, SIEM & PCAP captures

#### 1.3 Cyber Threat Intelligence (CTI)

&#x20;Monitor proactively intel feeds (gov, partners, vendors, open source) identify potential malicious activity

* Threat landscape reporting
* Threat actor profiles
* Organizational threats & campaigns

Indicators:

* Atomic: domains, IP address
* Computed: YARA rules, regex that detect signs of malicious activity
* Patterns & behaviors: TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, Procedures)

{% hint style="success" %}
Atomic indicators good for detecting initial signs of campaign, but shelf life limited as adversaries change their infrastructure often

Recommended to use Patterns & behaviors (sustainable context) -- MITRE ATTACK Framework
{% endhint %}

#### 1.4 Active Defence

* redirect adversary to sandbox or honeynet --> delay adversary and study TTPs
* Implement fake data objects (honeytokens) & fake accounts (canaries) for malicious activity
* Transference to Padded cells

#### 1.5 Operational Security

* Segment SOC systems separately from enterprise IT systems
* Sensors and security devices managed via out-of-band means
* Phone notification system of compromise/incidents
* Hardened workstations for monitoring and response activities
* Robust backup & recovery processes
* DO NOT submit malware samples/PII to public analysis services
* Ticketing or Case management system

## 2. Detection/Identification

Determine extent, type and magnitude of compromise of the incident

Where the incident occurred: cloud, OT, hybrid, host and network systems

{% hint style="success" %}

### Key Questions

* What was the initial attack vector? (i.e., How did the adversary gain initial access to the network?)&#x20;
* How is the adversary accessing the environment?&#x20;
* Is the adversary exploiting vulnerabilities to achieve access or privilege?&#x20;
* How is the adversary maintaining command and control?&#x20;
* Does the actor have persistence on the network or device?&#x20;
* What is the method of persistence (e.g., malware backdoor, webshell, legitimate credentials, remote tools, etc.)?&#x20;
* What accounts have been compromised and what privilege level (e.g., domain admin, local admin, user account, etc.)?&#x20;
* What method is being used for reconnaissance? (Discovering the reconnaissance method may provide an opportunity for detection and to determine possible intent.)&#x20;
* Is lateral movement suspected or known? How is lateral movement conducted (e.g., RDP, network shares, malware, etc.)?&#x20;
* Has data been exfiltrated and, if so, what kind and via what mechanism?
  {% endhint %}

#### 2.1 Declare incident

#### 2.2 Determine Investigation Scope

* Extent of compromise:
  * Assets
  * Level of privilege attained by adversary
  * Operational impact
* Discover the network data, host based artifacts --> Firewall, host, proxy, router traffic logs
* Endpoint forensics analysis --> capture a memory and disk image for evidence preservation
* Root cause & enabling conditions
* Gather indicators of incident
* Correlate events & Document timeline (logs) --> findings report during post-incident

#### 2.3 Match with Known Adversarial TTPs (MITRE ATTACK)

* Analyze how TTPs fit into the attack lifecycle --> why what and how
* Technical objectives --> Mechanisms --> Steps and Tools

<figure><img src="https://2068334946-files.gitbook.io/~/files/v0/b/gitbook-x-prod.appspot.com/o/spaces%2Fow1iM27u7disHeJiSlBC%2Fuploads%2F83gq3RnkI1ouR8fuTyrH%2Fimage.png?alt=media&amp;token=182a9a96-e9f8-4165-ade4-63159f46a270" alt=""><figcaption></figcaption></figure>

## 3. Containment

Prevent further damage and remove adversary access

#### 3.1 Considerations

* Any impact to current operations, availibity of services, business operations
* Duration of containment process, resources needed, extent of containment (Full, partial)
* Impact on collection, preservation, documentation of evidence

Dilemma: To be complete in containment, ensure business continuity but avoid tipping off adversary/ allowing adversary to persist

#### 3.2 Containment Procedures

Network Containment

* Isolate impacted systems and network segments from each other and non impacted systems and networks
* Update firewall filters
* Block & Lock unauthorized accesses, malware
* Scan for and Close specific unused ports and mail servers/others
* Change sys admin & user passwords, rotate private keys & service/application account secrets --> revocate privileged access (where compromise is not ruled out)
* Direct adversary to sandbox --> monitor activity, gather additionaly evidence, identify attack vectors

Business Continuity Planning (BCP)

* Consider business needs and establish temporary services provisioning
* Capture forensics images to preserve evidence (legal use)

## 4. Eradication & Recovery&#x20;

Allow return to normal operations by eliminating the artifacts of the incident (Remove malicious code, re-image infected systems, reboot, backup)

Mitigation of the vulnerability or other conditions of exploit

Before doing any recovery efforts, ensure that:

* All persistent access into network has been accounted for&#x20;
* Adversary activity contained
* Forensics evidence collected

#### 4.1 Eradication Process

* Remediate all infected IT environments (cloud, network, systems, OT, hybrid)
* Re-image infecte systems (rebuild from scratch)
* Rebuild hardware (if the compromise involves ROOTKITS)
* Replace compromised files with clean versions
* Install patches, check for updates
* Monitor signs of adversary response during containment activites
* Develop response scenarios for threat actor using possible alternative attack vectors

Continue detection and monitoring after ERADICATION --> if rediscovered, repeat containment, technical analysis --> until full scope of compromise confirmed.

Once no new adversary activity detected after set time, begin recovery phase:

#### 4.2 Recovery Process

* Reconnect and rebuild systems to networks
* Tighten perimeter security
  * Firewall rulesets
  * Boundary router ACLs
  * Zero trust access rules
* Monitor for abnormal behaviors

## 5. Post Incident&#x20;

Document incident, inform leadership, harden environments to prevent future incidents, apply lessons learnt for future trainings and policies

#### 5.1 Adjust & Tune Sensors, Alerts and Logs Collection

* Identify and address blind spots
* Emulate adversary TTPs to ensure counter measures in place are effective in detecting or mitigating the observed activities (Red team & Tuning team)

#### 5.2 Finalize Reports

* Provide post incident updates as required by Law & Higher management

#### 5.3 Lessons Learnt

* review the efefctiveness and efficiency of incident handling
* Initial root cause (Has it been eliminated?)
* Problems faced executing the courses of actions (COAs)
* Missing gaps in policies and procedures
* Infrastrcture gaps in security
* Review and update roles, responsibilities, interfaces and authority
* Identify technical and operational training needs
* Improving tools to perform detection, analysis and response&#x20;
